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Abstract
Why do people in rich countries not transfer more of their income to people in
the world’s poorest countries? To study this question and the relative importance
of needs, entitlements, and nationality in people’s social preferences, we conducted a
real effort fairness experiment where people in two of the world’s richest countries,
Norway and Germany, interacted directly with people in Uganda and Tanzania, two
of the world’s poorest countries. In this experiment, the participants were given the
opportunity to transfer money to poor persons with whom they were matched. The
study provides four main findings. First, entitlement considerations are crucial in
explaining the distributive behavior of rich people in the experiment; second, needs
considerations matter a lot for some participants; third, the participants acted as moral
cosmopolitans; and finally, the participants’ choices are consistent with a self-serving
bias in their social preferences.
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Why do people in rich countries not transfer more of their income to people in the world’s
poorest countries? A simple answer is that they are self-interested. That is, even though
they recognize the needs of the poor, they fail to act upon fairness considerations. But is
the picture this simple? In this paper, we study an alternative explanation. We suggest that
many rich people find it fair to keep most of their income, and that they justify this view by
invoking an entitlement argument of fairness. There are other possible explanations. Rich
people may believe they mainly have moral obligations towards their compatriots, and thus
may reject the idea of what is sometimes called moral cosmopolitanism. Or they may lack
trust in the efficiency of the governmental and non-governmental institutions that facilitate
such transfers.
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to study the relative impor-
tance of needs, entitlements, and nationality in people’s social preferences.1 We explicitly
designed the experiment to avoid the question of whether people trust the existing channels
of transfers. Hence, we conducted a real effort fairness game where people in two of the
world’s richest countries, Norway and Germany, interacted directly with people in Uganda
and Tanzania, two of the world’s poorest countries. The participants were given the oppor-
tunity to transfer money to poor persons with whom they were matched. This design made
needs considerations a salient feature of the distributive situation. To introduce entitlements
considerations, the distribution phase was preceded by a production phase where the par-
ticipants exerted real effort and earned income. On average, rich participants were more
productive than the poor participants, and thus the design provided a tension we believe
is important in many real life situations: needs pull toward giving the income to the poor
person, whereas entitlements pull toward giving most of the income to the rich person.
To study whether rich people feel that they have a special moral obligation toward their
compatriots, we also matched the rich participants with other participants from rich coun-
tries. In some distributive situations, they were matched with someone from their own
country, and in other distributive situations, with someone from another rich country. As
Norwegians and Germans are almost equally rich and were almost just as productive in the
experiment, only nationality considerations could explain a difference in the transfers in the
two types of distributive situations. Finally, to study the extent to which our findings were
the result of a self-serving bias among the rich, the poor participants also made a similar
1For related experimental studies of social preferences, see Aguiar, Bran˜as-Garza, and Miller (2007)
and Eckel and Grossman (1996) on the role of needs, Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007a);
Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007b); Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002); Frohlich, Oppenheimer,
and Kurki (2004); Konow (2000), and Konow (1996) on the role of entitlements, and Whitt and Wilson (2007)
on the role of nationality. For an overview of the experimental literature on social preferences, see Camerer
(2003).
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set of distributive choices where they were matched with rich participants, participants from
their own country, and participants from another poor country. If there were a self-serving
bias in the moral considerations of the participants, then rich participants should be less
egalitarian and assign greater weight to entitlements considerations relative to needs con-
siderations than poor participants. In sum, to study needs, entitlements, nationality and
self-serving bias, the experiment involved real effort and redistribution among participants
from four different countries.
What happens when rich meets poor? The study provides four main findings. First,
we find that entitlements considerations are crucial in explaining the distributive behavior
of rich participants in the experiment. On average, the rich participants kept 68.1 percent
of the total income for themselves when they met poor participants, and, based on the
estimation of a choice model, we show that much of this appears to have been motivated
by entitlements considerations. Moreover, entitlements considerations are also essential in
explaining the pattern of transfers from rich to poor; namely, on average, rich participants
transfered much more income to the productive poor than to the unproductive poor. Second,
needs considerations matter. When we remove the needs motive from the estimated choice
model, the predicted amount transferred from the rich to the poor decreases by a third. Needs
considerations are also essential in explaining why rich participants treated poor participants
differently from other rich participants. Rich participants gave away far more than the other
participant’s production value when they met a poor participant, but clearly less than the
other person’s production value when they met a rich participant. Third, the participants
acted as moral cosmopolitans. We do not find any evidence of compatriots being treated
differently in the distributive choices. Finally, participants’ choices are consistent with a self-
serving bias in the moral considerations. That is, rich participants are less egalitarian and
attach greater weight to entitlements considerations relative to needs considerations than
poor participants.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I provides a discussion of the experimental
design. Section II reports descriptive statistics and some basic observations from the exper-
iment. Section III introduces an individual choice model for the distributive behavior, while
the estimation of this model and simulations are presented in Section IV. Section V provides
some concluding remarks.
I Design
We conducted a dictator game where the distribution phase was preceded by a production
phase, and where participants were located in four different countries.
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In the standard version of the dictator game, the money to be distributed is “manna
from heaven”. In this experiment, however, the participants were asked to distribute money
they had earned in a production phase. This made entitlements considerations an important
part of the distributive problem, and the main focus of our study was to see how these
considerations were traded off against needs considerations when rich people decided how
much to transfer to poor people.
The participants were matched simultaneously with participants from all four countries.
Two of the countries, Norway and Germany, are among the world’s richest countries, while
the other two countries, Uganda and Tanzania, are among the poorest. Real GDP per capita
is 48 times higher in Norway, the richest country, than in Uganda, the poorest country
(Table 6, International Comparison Program 2008).
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants were given a complete description
of how the experiment would proceed. At each location, and as part of the introduction,
a research assistant took an overview picture of the lab and immediately uploaded it to
an Internet site. The pictures from all locations were then shown to all participants on
their computers after the introduction was completed. We did this to make the participants
familiar with the idea that they were taking part in an international experiment where they
would interact with participants from different parts of the world. All interaction between
the participants was anonymous and conducted through a web-based interface. English was
the language of communication in all four countries. It is an official language in both Uganda
and Tanzania, and German and Norwegian students are also fluent in English.2
I.A Sample
We conducted six sessions with a total of 391 students, recruited from the University of
Oslo in Norway, the University of Mannheim in Germany, the University of Makerere in
Uganda, and the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. All participants were recruited
from the general student population at the four universities. Table 1 provides an overview of
the nationality of the participants in the six sessions. Even though students in Uganda and
Tanzania are not among the poorest of the poor in these countries, they are still extremely
poor when compared with Norwegian and German students. Moreover, both the University
of Dar es Salaam and the University of Makerere receive support from the international
donor community, including Germany and Norway. Thus, it should be uncontroversial to
assume that, in our sample, needs considerations pulled toward giving the earned income to
the participants from Tanzania and Uganda.
2The screenshots and instructions to the participants are provided in an appendix (not for publication).
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As shown in Table 1, not all countries were represented in all sessions. In the first
session and the second session, we had some problems with the network. In the last session,
administrative reasons made it impossible to include two countries. However, we do not
find any difference in behavior between the incomplete sessions and the three sessions that
included all four countries, and thus, we apply the full data set in our analysis.
[Table 1 about here.]
I.B Production phase
The production phase was designed to capture some important features of a real life distribu-
tive situation, where differences in earnings may be due to differences in prices, individual
productivity, and working time. We introduced by design differences in price. As expected,
the participants had different productivity with respect to the task they were assigned. To
avoid excessive complexity, however, we did not introduce differences in working time, with
all participants working for 30 minutes.
At the beginning of the production phase, each participant was assigned the same text
in English. The task was to type as many correct words as possible from the assigned text
into a word processor file. Before they started to type, the computer assigned with equal
probability a price per correct word to each participant, either 0.1 USD or 0.05 USD. After 30
minutes they submitted their document to a program that calculated the number of correct
words. A participant’s production was the number of correct words he had typed during the
production phase. To give the participants easy numbers to work with in the distribution
phase of the experiment, the computer rounded up each participant’s production to the
nearest multiple of 50. The value of production for each participant was thus the product of
two factors: the number of correct words he had typed in 30 minutes and the price he had
been assigned per correct word.
I.C Distribution phase
In the distribution phase each participant was paired with another participant and asked
to distribute the total income, that is, the sum of the value of their own production and
the value of the other participant’s production. Before they made their decision, they were
given information about the price assigned to the other participant, his production, and
nationality.
The participants were asked to make proposals in, on average, eight independent dis-
tributive situations, where in each situation they were matched with a different participant.
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Before making a final submission of their proposals, they were given an overview of all of
their proposals and the opportunity to revise any of them.
When everyone had submitted their choices, the computer with equal probability selected
one of the situations for each person. The computer then selected, with equal probability,
either the person’s own proposal in this situation or the other participant’s proposal, as the
one determining his actual payment from the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, each participant was assigned a payment code. This code
was used as identification for anonymously receiving the payment from the experiment. The
payment procedure was designed to ensure that no one in the lab, including the research
group, knew how much each participant earned from the experiment.
II Descriptive evidence
In this section, we present results from the production and distribution phase of the experi-
ment.
II.A Results from the production phase
Table 2 provides statistics on production and production value in each country. Not sur-
prisingly, there were significant differences in productivity. Average production in the rich
countries was about three times the average production in the poor countries and, given that
prices were randomly assigned, there was a similar difference in production value.
[Table 2 about here.]
The results from the production phase imply that we recreated in the experiment an
important feature of real world inequality; namely, the more needy are, on average, less
productive. In 699 of 768 distributive situations where a rich person met a poor person, the
rich person had a higher production value (in 16 distributive situations they had the same
production value). In many cases, the difference was substantial, and the maximal difference
was obtained in a distributive situation where the rich had a production value of 140 USD
and the poor had a production value of 7.5 USD. On average, the rich participants’ share of
production was 73.4 percent, while their share of production value was 72.9 percent.
Table 3 provides information on the correlation between production and the randomly
assigned price. From the table we can see that only in Germany was there noticeably higher
average productivity with the higher price, but the difference is not more than 7 percent, and
is not statistically significant (using a one-sided t-test with a p-value of 0.18). We interpret
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this as showing that most participants exercised maximum effort throughout the 30 minutes,
and thus we do not include further discussion of the choice of effort.
[Table 3 about here.]
II.B Results from the distribution phase
On average, and as shown in Table 4, rich participants gave away 31.9 percent of total income
when matched with poor participants. However, there was large variation in the distributive
behavior of the rich. We observe that some rich participants gave away everything to the
poor, whereas some rich participants took everything for themselves. This shows that both
self-interest and needs play a role in the distributive choices of the rich.
[Table 4 about here.]
Why did most rich participants not give away more to the poor? We consider two
possible explanations in addition to self-interest. First, rich participants may not be moral
cosmopolitans, and thus may not have felt that they had a strong moral obligation toward
participants in other countries (whether rich or poor). Second, the rich participants may
have considered themselves morally entitled to a large share of total income, given that they
had created most of what was to be shared.
Let us first consider the role of entitlements considerations (see Konow (2003); Fleur-
baey (2008) for general discussions of entitlement theories). If all rich participants shared
the libertarian entitlement ideal that individuals are morally entitled to the value of their
production, this would justify, on average, their taking of 72.9 percent of total income when
meeting poor participants. Hence, entitlements considerations potentially provide an im-
portant explanation for why the rich participants did not transfer more of the total income
to the poor. Moreover, entitlements considerations may also explain why rich participants
differentiate among the poor; poor participants with a higher production value may have
been viewed as entitled to more than poor participants with a lower production value. In
this respect, it is important to note from Table 2 that there was substantial variation in
the production value among the poor; the maximum and minimum are 65 USD and 0 USD,
respectively.
It is not obvious, however, that all rich participants share a libertarian entitlement ideal.
It is commonly argued that people should be compensated for factors beyond individual
control, and this view can be given two different interpretations in the present experiment.
First, some may see this as implying that people should not be held responsible for the
randomly assigned price, but still held responsible for their productivity. We refer to this as
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the meritocratic entitlement ideal, where each person’s entitlement is defined by his share of
total production. The meritocratic entitlement ideal provides a very similar picture to the
libertarian entitlement ideal in this experiment, and would justify the rich taking, on average,
73.4 percent of the total income when meeting poor participants. Second, if productivity is
also considered to be beyond individual control, a drastically different picture emerges. All
individuals are then viewed as having the same entitlements, independent of their production
and the price. We refer to this as the egalitarian entitlement ideal. It implies that the poor
and the rich were both entitled to an equal share of the income.
We consider libertarianism, meritocratism, and egalitarianism as the salient entitlement
views in the distributive situations in this experiment. They all imply, on average, that the
rich participant was entitled to at least 50 percent of the total income. Libertarianism and
meritocratism also justify differentiating among the poor, giving a larger share to the pro-
ductive poor (meritocratism) or to the poor with a higher production value (libertarianism).
Egalitarianism, on the other hand, justifies giving the same share to all poor participants,
and thus does not provide a basis for differentiating among the poor.
Table 5 provides evidence of some rich participants differentiating among the poor, by
showing that the share of total income given is highly responsive to the poor’s share of pro-
duction. In Section IV, we study in more detail the extent to which this differentiation was
because of the participants being motivated by meritocratic or libertarian entitlement con-
siderations. We also observe from Table 5 that the participants’ responsiveness to production
and price was quite similar when they met rich and poor participants.
[Table 5 about here.]
To study the role of nationality and the extent to which the participants are moral cos-
mopolitans, we provide Table 6. It shows the average share given to the other participant
conditional on nationality. Given that the Norwegians and Germans were almost equally
productive, moral cosmopolitans would, on average, give almost the same share to partici-
pants from Norway and Germany. Indeed this is what we observe; Germans and Norwegians
gave almost the same to compatriots as to participants from the other rich country. The
small difference in share given corresponds to the small difference in productivity, where
both Norwegians and Germans gave a slightly larger share to slightly more productive Nor-
wegians. We observe the same pattern for the poor participants, where both Tanzanians
and Ugandans gave a slightly larger share to slightly more productive Ugandans. Hence, we
interpret Table 6 as providing strong evidence of the participants acting as moral cosmopoli-
tans in the experiment. This finding is in line with Whitt and Wilson (2007), who find that
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Muslims, Croats, and Serbs participating in a dictator game in post-war Bosnia–Herzegovina
favored to a surprisingly small degree participants of the same ethnicity.
[Table 6 about here.]
We have already provided in Table 4 some evidence for the presence of needs consid-
erations in rich participants’ distributive choices. Some give away everything to the poor,
and such behavior can hardly be explained by anything other than the needs motive. To
illustrate further, consider participant 291, whose value of production was 85 USD. He was
matched with seven other participants; four poor and three rich. The poor had USD pro-
duction values of 15, 27.5, 30 and 32.5, whereas the rich had USD production values of 65,
70 and 75. In all matches with the poor participants, he transferred everything to the poor;
in contrast, in matches with the rich participants, he gave away 43–47 percent of the total
income.
More generally, needs considerations also appear to be important in explaining the pat-
tern of transfers presented in Table 7. This table reports the amount given to the other
participant as a fraction of his production value. We find here a systematic difference in
behavior toward poor and rich participants. Rich participants gave away far more than the
other participant’s production value when they met a poor participant, but far less than the
other participant’s production value when they met a rich participant. Similarly, partici-
pants from the poor countries gave away a smaller share of the production value when they
met a rich participant than when they met a poor participant.
[Table 7 about here.]
This transfer pattern is consistent with the participants being motivated by needs consider-
ations in their distributive choices. However, it could also be explained by the egalitarian
entitlements ideal, which justifies giving, on average, a larger share of the production to poor
participants to compensate for their lower productivity. In Section IV, we study in greater
detail the extent to which the findings in Table 7 are mainly the result of participants acting
on the needs motive or the egalitarian entitlement motive.
To summarize, the participants in the experiment acted as moral cosmopolitans. They
also appear to have been motivated by both entitlements and needs considerations. This
creates a moral tension when the more productive rich meets the less productive poor, and
we now provide a choice model to study this tension in more detail.
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III A model of distributional choices
We model the participants as moral cosmopolitans assigning weight to self-interest, needs,
and entitlements considerations when making distributional choices.3 Importantly, the model
allows the participants to differ in both the relative importance they assign to entitlements
and needs and in their perception of what constitutes a fair entitlement.
III.A The utility function
We assume that person i makes a trade-off between self-interest and the two moral consid-
erations in distributional choices. More specifically, we assume that the choices are based on
the following utility function:
(1) V
k(i)
i (y; ·) = y − βi(y −mk(i))2/2X − δαi(y −mP )2/2X.
X is the total income to be distributed and y is the income a person keeps for himself. The
weight individual i attaches to the entitlement ideal mk(i) is given by βi, and the weight
attached to the needs ideal mP is given by αi. Needs considerations are not always relevant,
and thus we introduce the indicator δ; δ = 1 when a rich and a poor person meets, otherwise
δ = 0.
Both entitlements and needs considerations imply an ideal distribution of the total in-
come. Entitlements considerations are based only on information on each individual’s con-
tribution, where we assume that an individual i endorses either the egalitarian ideal (mE),
the meritocratic ideal (mM), or the libertarian ideal (mL):
mE(i) = X/2,(2a)
mM(i) =
ai
ai + aj
X,(2b)
mL(i) = piai,(2c)
where ai is the production and piai the production value of individual i. Consequently,
X = piai + pjaj, and X − mk(i) is what individual i considers to be individual j’s fair
entitlement.
We assume that needs considerations imply that the ideal distribution would be that the
3For other models of social preferences, see Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Charness and Rabin (2002);
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). See also Andreoni and Miller (2002) and
Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007) for studies of the consistency of social preferences.
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rich person gives all the income to the poor person. Such a view can be justified in different
ways: for example, by appealing to the fact that the expected welfare gain from the income
earned in the experiment is much greater for poor participants.
(3) mP =
0 if i is rich and the other participant is poor,X if i is poor and the other participant is rich.
If an interior solution exists, the optimal proposal when a rich participant meets a poor
participant (δ = 1) is
y∗ = [τimk(i) + (1− τi)mP ] + X
βi + αi
,
where τi = βi/(βi+αi). The terms within the brackets provide the income person i considers
to be justifiable on moral grounds to give to himself, and reflects the trade-off between
entitlements considerations and needs considerations. The last term provides the additional
income a person takes because of self-interest. A very self-interested person has low values
of β and α, and thus takes most (or all) of the total income for himself. A person mainly
acting on needs considerations has a low β and a high α, and consequently a low τ , whereas
the opposite is the case for a person mainly acting on entitlements considerations. Thus,
τ captures the relative importance of the two moral motives in a person’s distributional
choices.
The interior solution when participants of the same income level meet (δ = 0) is
y∗ = mk(i) +
X
βi
.
Hence, when needs considerations are irrelevant, a person would keep what he considers
himself morally entitled to plus an additional amount that is decreasing in the weight he
attaches to entitlements considerations.
Actual choices may differ from the interior solution for three main reasons. First, y∗
could be larger than total income, and thus the argument that maximizes V k(i)(y; ·) would
be the corner solution X. Second, participants were constrained in their choices by design,
and could only choose in discrete steps from the choice set Y = {0, 2.5, 5, . . . , X}. Third,
choices may differ from the optimum y∗ because of random shocks.
To handle these deviations from the interior solution, we use a random utility framework
(McFadden 1974), where total utility is assumed to be the sum of a deterministic part (in
our context, V ) and a random part that is specific to each alternative in the choice set Y .
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Total utility is then given by
(4) Ui(y; ·) = V k(i)i (y; ·) + εiy/γ for all y ∈ Y ,
where γ captures the importance of the random part, and the individual choice is given by
the argument that maximizes Ui on Y . We make the standard assumption that the ε is an
i.i.d. extreme value variate, which gives rise to choice probabilities of the particularly simple
logit form.4
III.B The likelihood function
In formulating the likelihood function, we need to take into account that the entitlements
ideal, mk(i), and the weight attached to entitlements and needs considerations, αi and βi,
are unobserved characteristics of the individual. Furthermore, we must respect the panel
structure of the data set.
For pragmatic reasons, we approximate the distribution of (α, β) with a bivariate log
normal distribution, where the distribution is parameterized such that (logα, log β) ∼
N(µα, µβ, σα, σβ, ρ). Moreover, we let λ
E, λM , and λL represent the estimated shares
of the population acting on the egalitarian, meritocratic, and libertarian entitlement
ideals, respectively. In sum, all parameters to be estimated are contained in θ =
(µα, µβ, σα, σβ, ρ, γ, λ
E, λM , λL).
To capture that we have repeated observations of each individual, let s = 1, . . . , Si index
the distributive situations where individual i makes a choice. In each, (yis,Ys,as,ps, δs)
are the observable variables; yis is the amount of money i takes for himself in s; Ys =
{0, 2.5, . . . ,ps · as} is the set of all possible choices i could make in s; as,ps are the vectors
representing the productivities and the prices of the two individuals matched in s; and δs is
the indicator showing whether the other participant in s is at the same income level as i.
4The extreme value assumption is sometimes considered controversial because it implies that the relative
choice probability between two alternatives is independent of which other alternatives are present in the
choice set (Train 2003). In our context, however, this feature appears attractive. Given that the choice
problem is to distribute money, it is natural to assume that the fineness of the discrete grid on [0, X] does
not affect the shape of the distribution of choice probabilities.
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We can now state the likelihood contribution of an individual i as
(5) Li(θ) =
∑
k∈{E,M,L}
λk
∫∫ [ Si∏
s=1
exp
(
γV k(yis,as,ps, δs, β, α)
)∑
r∈Ys exp (γV
k(r,as,ps, δs, β, α))
× f(α, β;µα, µβ, σα, σβ, ρ)
]
dαdβ,
where f(α, β;µα, µβ, σα, σβ, ρ) is the density of (α, β).
IV Estimates and simulations
We separately estimate the choice model for participants from the rich and poor countries,
and apply these estimated models to study the importance of different motivations in ex-
plaining the observed level and pattern of transfers.
IV.A The estimates of the choice model
Table 8 reports the estimates of the choice model. The first specification reports the estimates
for the full choice model. The second and the third specification provide robustness tests.
[Table 8 about here.]
Considering our preferred specification A, we observe that the meritocratic entitlement
ideal is most prominent among rich participants. The model estimates that 42.1 percent
of rich participants are meritocrats who find it fair that people are rewarded according to
their productivity. This implies that, if acting purely on entitlements considerations, they
would transfer more to the productive poor than the unproductive poor. So would the share
of libertarians, estimated to be 34.1 percent of all rich participants, and thus the estimated
model predicts that 76.2 percent of the rich participants would take productivity into account
when determining how much to transfer to the poor participants. At the same time, the
estimated share of egalitarians is 23.8 percent, and thus the model also predicts that 65.9
percent of the rich participants, the egalitarians and the meritocrats, would not take the
randomly assigned price into account when determining how much to transfer to the poor
participants.5
To interpret the estimates of the distributions of α (the weight attached to needs) and
β (the weight attached to entitlements), it is useful to study the implied distribution of
τ = β/(β + α), as presented in Figure 1.
5The population share estimates are in line with the findings in Cappelen et al. (2007b).
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[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 provides a strong message on the relative importance of the two moral motives. We
observe that entitlements considerations are much more important than needs considerations
for the participants. In fact, for more than 50 percent of the rich participants, entitlements
considerations completely dominate needs considerations. Regardless, it is also evident from
Figure 1 that needs considerations matter a lot for some rich participants; 17.1 percent of
rich participants assign more weight to needs than to entitlements.
If we now compare the estimates for the rich participants with the estimates for the poor
participants, we observe that there is a larger share of egalitarians and a smaller share of
meritocrats among the poor participants. With respect to the relative importance of needs
and entitlements, we find from Figure 1 that needs are more essential in explaining the
choices of the poor participants than of the rich participants. In fact, 33.9 percent of the
poor participants assigned more weight to needs than to entitlements when meeting rich
participants. These differences between the rich and the poor are consistent with a self-
serving bias in the participants’ moral perceptions.6 It benefits the rich not to be egalitarian
and to assign more importance to entitlements than needs, and it benefits the poor to be
egalitarian and assign more importance to needs than entitlements.
In specification B, we correct for differences in purchasing power between the rich and
the poor countries when calculating fair entitlements. Egalitarians may find it fair that the
two participants have the same purchasing power from the sum of money they receive in
the experiment. If so, the purchasing power corrected version of the egalitarian entitlements
ideal mEppp(i) should imply that φc(i)m
Eppp(i) = φc(j)(X − mEppp(i)), where φc(i) denotes the
price level conversion factor that converts USD into local purchasing power for country c of
individual i.7 Meritocrats may find it fair that an individual’s share of total income when
corrected for differences in purchasing power is equal to his share of the production; hence,
ai/(ai+aj) = (φc(i)m
Mppp(i))/(φc(i)m
Mppp(i) +φc(j)(X−mMppp(i))). Libertarians, however, find
it fair that people receive whatever income they have created in the production phase, and
thus we do not correct for differences in purchasing power when calculating the libertarian
entitlement ideal.
The modified versions of the egalitarian and meritocratic entitlement ideals are then
given by:
6See Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer (1995); Babcock and Loewenstein (1997); Dana,
Weber, and Kuang (2007); Konow (2000) and Messick and Sentis (1983) for discussions of self-serving biases.
7The price level conversion factor (φc) is defined as the ratio between the exchange rate (Local Currency
Unit (LCU) per USD) and the Purchasing Power Parity of the category “actual individual consumption”
(LCU per international $). We have used data from International Comparison Program (2008, Table 1). The
price level conversion factors are 0.684, 0.917, 2.882 and 2.785 for Norway, Germany, Uganda and Tanzania.
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mEppp(i) =
φc(i)
φc(i) + φc(j)
X,(6a)
mMppp(i) =
aiφc(j)
aiφc(j) + ajφc(i)
X.(6b)
We observe that the log likelihood values for specification B are much lower than for specifi-
cation A in Table 8, and standard information-based criteria would clearly favor specification
A.8
Specification C only uses data from matches within income groups (where rich meets
rich and poor meets poor). If rich participants applied a different entitlement ideal when
meeting poor participants, then this specification should give different population estimates
than the full model. This is not the case for the rich participants; the estimated shares of
the different entitlement ideals in the restricted model are almost the same as for the full
model. The picture is less clear for the poor participants, where we observe a difference in
the estimates between the full model and the restricted model. However, in a comparison
of rich and poor participants, the overall picture is the same: there are more egalitarians
among the poor participants.
IV.B Simulations
To further study the fit of the model, the relative importance of the different motives, and
the extent of a self-serving bias in the choices, we provide simulations based on the estimates
in specification (A) in Table 8.
The columns (S+E+N) in Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11 reporting simulation results
of the full model, show that the estimated model nicely predicts both the observed level and
the pattern of transfers from rich to poor.
Let us now consider why the rich participants do not transfer more of the income to the
poor participants. First, we study the role of self-interest by looking at what the partic-
ipants would have done as impartial spectators (i.e., when self-interest is not at stake) in
the same set of distributive situations. In our framework, this amounts to simulating a re-
stricted version of the estimated choice model where the participants are only motivated by
entitlements and needs considerations: column (E+N) in Table 9. Interestingly, we observe
8Specification A and B are not nested, and thus standard likelihood ratio tests do not apply. However,
since they have the same number of parameters, it is instructive to consider standard information-based
criteria, such as the Akaike (AIC) and the Bayesian (BIC) information criteria. To place the difference in
likelihood in a quantitative context, the likelihood difference is large enough that specification A would be
preferred, even if it had 55 (AIC) or 21 (BIC) parameters more than specification B.
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that it is not only self-interest that constrains rich participants from giving everything to
poor participants. Even if they acted as impartial spectators, they would have given most
of the income, 54.6 percent, to the rich participant. In short, given the observed differences
in production, the rich participants found it morally acceptable that they received a larger
share of the total income. Self-interest implied that they took even more than what they
considered morally acceptable; on average, the increase is 13.7 percentage points (from 54.6
to 68.3 percent). This illustrates that even a substantial reduction in the weight assigned to
self-interest among the rich would not have a huge effect on the average level of transfers to
the poor.
Needs considerations matter for the rich, as illustrated by the simulations reported in
columns (S+E) and (S+N) in Table 9. Column (S+E) reports what the rich participants
would have done in the same set of distributive situations if the poor participants were
not poor, and we observe that the predicted average share given away would have dropped
by 9.2 percentage points (from 31.7 percent to 22.5 percent). Alternatively, assume that
entitlements considerations were not relevant: see column (S + N). The estimated model
now predicts that the rich, motivated by needs considerations, would have given away, on
average, 37.9 percent of the total income. This shows that they assign quite some weight
to needs in a trade-off with self-interest. The simulation (S +N) may be seen as capturing
the kind of situation studied by Eckel and Grossman (1996), where the participants were
asked to divide a sum of money (not earned) between themselves and a local branch of the
American Red Cross. Interestingly, our predicted average transfer is slightly above that
observed by Eckel and Grossman (1996), where the average transfer was 31 percent of the
total income.
[Table 9 about here.]
Entitlements and needs are also important in explaining the pattern of transfers from
rich to poor. Not surprisingly, the entitlement motive is crucial in explaining why rich
participants give more to the productive poor. To illustrate, we provide Table 10. It shows
that the full model nicely predicts the responsiveness of the share given to relative production
and relative price. In contrast, if entitlements considerations were deemed irrelevant in these
situations, then, from column (S +N), we observe that this relationship would vanish.
[Table 10 about here.]
The needs motive, however, is required to explain why the share of the opponent’s pro-
duction value given by rich participants to poor participants is twice the share given to other
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rich participants. As shown in Table 11, the full model captures this pattern of differentia-
tion between rich and poor opponents. If we remove the needs motive, the restricted model
S + E underestimates the share given to poor participants. In other words, the presence of
egalitarians, who would also give a larger share of the production value to poor participants,
does not fully account for this pattern.
[Table 11 about here.]
To study further the extent to which the choices of the rich are consistent with a self-
serving bias, we compare them with the choices of the poor. We observe from Table 12
that the prediction is that the poor would have acted differently than the rich as impartial
spectators in the same set of distributive situations. The poor impartial spectator would
have given, on average, 43.7 percent to the rich participant and 56.3 percent to the poor
participant. In the same set of situations, the rich impartial spectator would have given, on
average, 54.6 percent to the rich participant, and 45.4 percent to the poor participant. This is
in line with rich participants assigning greater weight to entitlements considerations relative
to needs considerations than poor participants, and is thus consistent with a self-serving
bias in moral perceptions. However, as can be seen from Table 12, the model underpredicts
somewhat the overall level of transfers from poor to rich, and this may partly explain the
observed differences in predicted impartial spectator behavior.
Finally, it is interesting to observe that moral considerations played an equally important
role for poor participants as for rich participants. The predicted share of total income given
away when self-interest is introduced decreases from 45.4 percent to 31.7 percent for the rich
participants, whereas it decreases from 43.7 percent to 33.7 percent for poor participants.
This shows that moral considerations are not a luxury the poor cannot afford; rather a basic
motivation that is essential in explaining their distributive choices.
[Table 12 about here.]
V Concluding remarks
Much work on social preferences has focused on explaining why people give more away in
distributive situations than that predicted by pure self-interest. In contrast, we have studied
the extent to which a particular set of moral considerations, entitlements considerations,
may contribute to explaining why people in the world’s richest countries do not give away
more of their income to people in the world’s poorest countries.
Our main finding is that entitlements considerations are essential in explaining the choices
of rich participants in the experiment, and are far more important than needs considerations.
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Even if the rich participants had acted as impartial spectators, they would have given away
less than 50 percent to the poor participants. This clearly illustrates that it is not only
self-interest that constrains people’s willingness to transfer income to others. Moreover, the
importance of entitlements considerations also explains why rich participants differentiated
among poor participants, and transferred a larger amount of money to the productive poor.
This is not to say that needs considerations are irrelevant in explaining distributive
behavior. If the needs motive were removed, the estimated choice model predicts that the
average share of transfers from rich to poor would decrease from 31.7 percent to 22.5 percent
of total income. In addition, the needs motive contributes to explaining the fact that the
share of the opponent’s production value given by rich participants to poor participants
was much larger than the share given to other rich participants. However, there are large
differences in the importance assigned to needs considerations. Almost 50 percent of the
rich participants assigned almost no weight to needs in their choices, whereas 17.1 percent
assigned more weight to needs than to entitlements.
The experiment was conducted with students in Tanzania and Uganda, and one may
argue that the needs motive would have played a more prominent role if we rather involved
the poorest of the poor in these two countries. However, even if this were the case, it is not
clear what would have been the overall impact on average transfers from rich to poor. It seems
likely that the production of the poor participants also would have been lower in this case, and
this would have pulled toward giving less, on average, to the poor participants. Moreover,
it is important to note that the rich participants in the experiment clearly acknowledged
the needs of the poor participants. In fact, we predict that if entitlements considerations
were not present, the rich participants would have transferred 37.9 percent of total income
to poor partcipants, and this is more than what was actually transferred to the American
Red Cross in the experiment of Eckel and Grossman (1996). Hence, our main finding is
not that rich participants did not recognize the needs of the participants, and thus assigned
much importance to entitlement considerations; rather, our experiment shows that even in
a situation were the needs of the poor clearly are recognised, entitlements considerations
appear to play a far more important role in distributive choices.
By comparing the choices of the rich and poor participants, we have also shown that
these choices are consistent with a self-serving bias in the social preferences. The rich are
less egalitarian and assign relatively greater importance to entitlements considerations than
the poor. However, there are other possible explanations for this observations. For example,
Uganda and Tanzania have only recently introduced substantial market reforms and have
historically relied on egalitarian social and family structures. These cultural and social
factors have most likely played an important role in shaping the social preferences that the
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poor participants in this experiment acted upon (see also Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer,
Fehr, and Gintis (2004)).
Finally, we do not find any bias with respect to nationality. The participants, rich and
poor, acted as moral cosmopolitans, and treated compatriots in the same manner as others.
However, this finding is not inconsistent with people perceiving that they have special moral
obligations toward compatriots in many real-life situations. Such special moral obligations
may, for example, arise from sharing a common institutional framework or other special
relations with compatriots. These features were not present in this experiment, where the
participants interacted within the same framework and enjoyed the same sort of relations
with participants from all of the countries. In such a setting, it is interesting to observe that
nationality itself did not appear to generate a feeling of special moral obligations towards
compatriots.
We believe that the tension between entitlements considerations and needs considerations
is important in a number of settings, including studies of international political initiatives
in global development. Political initiatives, such as the United Nations Millennium Devel-
opment Goals, fair trade initiatives, and debt relief campaigns place different emphasis on
entitlements and needs. For example, the Millennium Development initiative argues that
needs considerations should be given absolute priority, whereas fair trade initiatives argue
that the fundamental moral problem of international distribution is that producers in poor
countries do not receive their fair entitlement. Other initiatives, such as the Jubilee Debt
Campaign, appear to appeal to both entitlements and needs considerations when arguing
for the cancellation of debt.
Typically, needs considerations justify far more redistribution than entitlements consid-
erations, which may make it tempting for proponents of large-scale schemes of international
redistribution to appeal to the needs argument. This may not be a wise strategy, however, if,
as suggested by our experiment, entitlements considerations carry much more weight in the
populations of rich countries. Initiatives justified on the basis of entitlements considerations
may then find greater political support and be more sustainable than initiatives justified on
the basis of needs considerations. Moreover, our study illustrates why making the rich less
self-interested would not necessarily have a big impact on the amount of money transferred
to the poor. In our experiment, we predict that a move from the actual level of self-interest
to the very unlikely situation where everyone acts as impartial spectators would not imply
the increase in average transfers from rich to poor of more than 13.7 percentage points (from
31.7 to 45.4 percent). This illustrates that if we were to observe a marginal decrease in
self-interest in the richest countries of world, we should not expect a substantial increase in
transfers to the poor. More morally oriented individuals do not only assign more weight to
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needs, but also to entitlements, and thus the net effect of a reduction in self-interest depends
on the relative importance of these two moral considerations.
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Figure 1: The distribution of τ for rich and poor.
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Note: The figure is based on the estimates reported in column A in Table 8.
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Table 1: Number of participants per session
Country
session Norway Germany Uganda Tanzania total
1 20 0 22 21 63
2 17 18 0 0 35
3 20 17 22 21 80
4 21 20 22 22 85
5 22 20 22 21 85
6 22 0 0 21 43
total 122 75 88 106 391
Table 2: Production by country
Number of correct words
Norway Germany Uganda Tanzania
Mean 750.0 682.7 271.0 242.5
SE(mean) 25.4 24.9 13.2 10.7
Standard deviation 280.6 216.3 123.6 110.6
minimum 250 200 50 0
25th percentile 550 550 200 150
75th percentile 900 800 300 300
maximum 1700 1400 650 650
Production value in USD
Norway Germany Uganda Tanzania
Mean 54.8 55.77 19.7 18.3
SE(mean) 2.50 2.90 1.16 1.13
Standard deviation 27.7 25.1 10.9 11.7
minimum 15 15 2.5 0
25th percentile 32.5 35 12.5 15
75th percentile 70 75 26.25 20
maximum 135 140 50 65
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Table 3: Average production by country and price
price (USD/word)
Country of decision maker 0.05 0.10 total
Norway 756.9 742.1 750.0
(37.0) (34.5) (25.4)
Germany 653.4 701.1 682.7
(43.6) (30.1) (25.0)
Uganda 270.8 271.2 271.0
(20.3) (16.0) (13.2)
Tanzania 239.6 245.3 242.5
(11.5) (18.2) (10.7)
Table 4: Rich meets poor: statistics on share of total income given to the poor
Mean 0.319
Median 0.316
Standard deviation 0.210
Share that takes all 0.107
Share that gives all 0.018
n 768
Table 5: Responsiveness of the share of total income given to the share of production and
the relative price
Rich meets poor Rich meets rich Poor meets rich Poor meets poor
a2/(a1 + a2) 0.549 0.461 0.081 0.161
(0.114) (0.139) (0.125) (0.059)
p2/p1 0.017 0.054 0.039 0.046
(0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018)
Constant 0.154 0.038 0.311 0.232
(0.042) (0.068) (0.096) (0.039)
Observations 768 820 768 802
R2 0.084 0.079 0.010 0.031
Note: The dependent variable in the regressions is the share of total income given to the
other participant. The independent variables are the other participant’s share of production,
a2/(a1 + a2), and the relative price of the two participants, p2/p1.
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Table 6: Average share of total income given conditional on nationality
Country of the other participant
total Norway Germany Uganda Tanzania
Norway 0.365 0.378 0.368 0.368 0.348
(0.007) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
Germany 0.256 0.273 0.255 0.251 0.236
(0.009) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017)
Uganda 0.417 0.426 0.459 0.418 0.381
(0.008) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.013)
Tanzania 0.366 0.379 0.433 0.356 0.318
(0.008) (0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015)
Table 7: Average share given to the other participant of his production value
Other participant
Rich Poor
Rich 0.691 1.456
(0.017) (0.051)
Poor 0.590 0.828
(0.013) (0.022)
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Table 8: Estimates of the choice model
A B C
Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor
λE, share egalitarian 0.238 0.323 0.232 0.404 0.225 0.449
(0.039) (0.040) (0.045) (0.040) (0.041) (0.044)
λM , share meritocratic 0.421 0.343 0.229 0.320 0.425 0.266
(0.049) (0.040) (0.049) (0.039) (0.054) (0.039)
λL, share libertarian 0.341 0.333 0.539 0.276 0.351 0.285
(0.046) (0.039) (0.050) (0.037) (0.049) (0.040)
γ 11.997 17.421 9.659 26.907 11.598 28.718
(0.184) (0.715) (0.164) (1.141) (0.268) (1.784)
µα −0.998 0.284 −0.186 −0.451
(0.211) (0.225) (0.164) (0.137)
µβ 2.395 1.654 2.212 1.748 2.203 1.736
(0.180) (0.135) (0.148) (0.073) (0.215) (0.165)
σα 3.648 1.691 3.456 1.658
(0.116) (0.168) (0.122) (0.099)
σβ 3.677 2.154 2.902 1.203 4.183 1.821
(0.118) (0.130) (0.111) (0.056) (0.334) (0.154)
ρ 0.525 −0.472 0.584 0.671
(0.021) (0.042) (0.023) (0.030)
logL −3687.6 −3328.8 −4072.1 −3384.4 −2023.5 −1497.9
Note: Specifications A and B report estimates of the full model. Specification A applies the
entitlement ideals as formulated in equations (2a), (2b), and (2c); specification B applies the
entitlement ideals as formulated in (6a), (6b), and (2c). Specification C estimates a restricted
model, that only uses observations from distributive situations involving participants of the
same income level. Hence, the parameters pertaining to the needs motive (µα, σα and ρ)
are not estimated. The parameters pertaining to the entitlement motive are estimated by
applying the same entitlement ideals as in specification A. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are calculated using the BHHH method (Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman 1974). Money is
scaled in units of 100 USD. One of the estimated population shares and its standard error are
calculated residually. The likelihood is maximized using the FmOpt library (Ferrall 2005).
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Table 9: Rich meets poor: how important are different motivations?
Simulations with different motivations
statistic on share given data S + E +N E +N S + E S +N
Mean 0.319 0.317 0.454 0.225 0.379
Median 0.316 0.267 0.435 0.194 0.208
Standard deviation 0.210 0.246 0.255 0.173 0.372
Share that takes all 0.107 0.075 0.013 0.103 0.141
Share that gives all 0.018 0.011 0.024 1.4e-4 0.087
n 768 768000 768000 768000 768000
Note: The simulations are based on the estimates reported for the rich in column A in
Table 8. These are calculated with 1000 replications of each individual and the distributive
situations in which he is involved. Each replication is randomly assigned an entitlement
ideal, α and β, in accordance with the estimates. S+E+N refers to a simulation of the full
model, where all motives, self-interest (S), entitlements (E), and needs (N) are included.
The other simulations exclude one of these motives in turn.
Table 10: Rich meets poor: responsiveness of the share of total income given to the share of
production and the relative price.
Simulations with different motivations
data S + E +N E +N S + E S +N
a2/(a1 + a2) 0.549 0.434 0.483 0.469 0.023
p2/p1 0.017 0.038 0.037 0.042 0.011
Constant 0.154 0.160 0.285 0.054 0.361
n 768 768000 768000 768000 768000
R2 0.084 0.044 0.049 0.106 0.000
Note: The simulations are based on the estimates reported for the rich in column A in
Table 8. They are calculated with 1000 replications of each individual and the distributive
situations in which he is involved. Each replication is randomly assigned an entitlement
ideal, α and β, in accordance with the estimates. S+E+N refers to a simulation of the full
model, where all motives, self-interest (S), entitlements (E), and needs (N) are included.
The other three simulations exclude one of these motives in turn.
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Table 11: Rich meets poor: average share left to the other participant of his production
value.
Simulations with different motivations
data S + E +N E +N S + E S +N
Rich opponent 0.691 0.685 1.082 0.685 0.163
Poor opponent 1.456 1.471 2.159 0.993 1.900
Note: The simulations are based on the estimates reported for the rich in column A in
Table 8. They are calculated with 1000 replications of each individual and the distributive
situations in which he is involved. Each replication is randomly assigned an entitlement
ideal, α and β, in accordance with the estimates. S+E+N refers to a simulation of the full
model, where all motives, self-interest (S), entitlements (E), and needs (N) are included.
The other three simulations exclude one of these motives in turn.
Table 12: Poor meets rich: how important are different motivations?
Simulations with different motivations
statistic on share given data S + E +N E +N S + E S +N
Mean 0.415 0.337 0.437 0.401 0.054
Median 0.467 0.318 0.463 0.429 0.031
Standard deviation 0.235 0.270 0.264 0.272 0.076
Share that takes all 0.051 0.125 0.051 0.083 0.407
Share that gives all 0.012 6.9e-4 0.003 0.002 2.2e-5
n 768 768000 768000 768000 768000
Note: The simulations are based on the estimates reported for the poor in column A in
Table 8. They are calculated with 1000 replications of each individual and the distributive
situations in which he is involved. Each replication is randomly assigned an entitlement
ideal, α and β, in accordance with the estimates. S+E+N refers to a simulation of the full
model, where all motives, self-interest (S), entitlements (E), and needs (N) are included.
The other three simulations exclude one of these motives in turn.
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